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Acknowledgement: The behavioral and neurosciences have made 
remarkable progress in the past couple decades. Major advances have been 
made in understanding a wide range of phenomena, from epigenetics and 
neural plasticity to the nature of cognition, emotion, consciousness, moral 
reasoning, social behavior, and culture. Indeed, so much has been learned 
about human psychology recently that current explanations of many 
psychological mechanisms and processes are markedly different from those 
considered current just a generation ago. 
At the same time that the scientific understanding of psychology 
was surging forward, however, professional psychology (PP) went 
through a particularly challenging period. There has always been 
competition and divisiveness between the theoretical camps in the 
field, but the seriousness of the conflicts increased in the 1990s. The 
movement to establish empirically validated treatments was highly 
contentious and the divisiveness surrounding recovered memories of 
child sexual abuse was some of the most serious ever in the history of 
psychology (Loftus & Davis, 2006). Many leading psychologists were 
concerned that the conflicts and divisions had become so serious that 
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the field might not be able to continue as a single discipline (e.g., 
Benjamin, 2001; Staats, 2005; Sternberg, 2005). The role of 
psychologists, counselors, social workers, and other mental health 
therapists in providing behavioral health care also declined from the 
1990s to the 2000s while the proportion of clients with mental health 
problems treated by psychiatrists and general medical practitioners 
increased (Wang et al., 2006). 
Professional psychology has made substantial progress in 
working through several of these issues over the past decade. 
Contemporary research tends to use stronger designs, measurements, 
and statistical analyses than what were used in the past, and there is 
less controversy regarding published research findings as a result. 
Widespread consensus has also developed regarding the need to apply 
evidence-based practice guidelines when providing behavioral health 
care (American Psychological Association [APA] Presidential Task Force 
on Evidence-Based Practice, 2006). These and other developments 
have helped rein in issues that might have led to significant 
controversy in the past, and several observers have noted that conflict 
and divisiveness in the field have declined generally (e.g., Goodheart & 
Carter, 2008).  
Beyond these trends, there is also a more fundamental change 
taking place. Recent research on human behavior has advanced so 
significantly that the current scientific understanding of human 
psychology is now fundamentally different from many of the standard 
approaches PP traditionally used to understand human development, 
functioning, and behavior change. For example, PP education has often 
relied on an array of competing theoretical orientations for case 
conceptualization and other important aspects of clinical training, 
whereas these orientations are rarely mentioned in current scientific 
explanations of human development and behavior (these issues are all 
discussed more extensively in the next two sections). As a result, PP 
needs to reconsider the standard frameworks and curriculum it uses 
for education and training in the field. PP needs to keep current with 
the underlying science, and outdated frameworks and practices need 
to be identified and replaced based on the best scientific evidence 
available. 
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The main question addressed in this article concerns whether PP 
needs to undergo a fundamental transition from the era when the 
traditional theoretical orientations provided the main conceptual 
foundations for clinical education and practice to an era based instead 
on an integrated scientific understanding of human psychology. Such a 
transition would be of historic importance for the field and would result 
in major changes to PP education and practice. Evaluating whether 
such a transition needs to take place, however, requires an 
appreciation of the nature of theory and research in the field. 
Therefore, this article begins with a brief historical review of theory 
and research in psychology, so that the earlier approaches can be 
contrasted with the current scientific understanding of human 
psychology. 
Professional Psychology in the Preparadigmatic 
Era 
 
A wide variety of theoretical approaches have been used to 
understand human development, functioning, and behavior change 
across the history of PP. Understanding the reasons for this diversity of 
approaches is important for appreciating the evolution and current 
status of the field. 
The Proliferation of Theoretical Orientations 
When psychology was becoming established as a scientific 
discipline in the second half of the 19th century, there were two main 
approaches to understanding mental phenomena. The first of these 
was mental philosophy. The work of John Locke (1690), who proposed 
the conceptualization of the mind as a tabula rasa, or blank slate, in 
1690, was particularly influential. The second main approach involved 
the experimental methods that emerged from the scientific revolution, 
including the anatomical and physiological investigations that were 
being conducted in biology and medicine (e.g., Hermann Helmholtz’s 
1850 discovery of the speed of nerve conduction and Paul Broca’s 
1861 discovery of a brain lesion in a man who had lost the ability to 
speak; Benjamin, 2014). Fechner’s 1860Elements of Psychophysics 
proved to be a watershed in convincing scientists that it was possible 
to reliably measure psychological, and not just physiological, 
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phenomena and that a science of psychology was consequently 
possible. 
Over the next century, a wide variety of alternative approaches 
to understanding human psychology were proposed. Freud proposed 
that it was actually subconscious processes, rather than the conscious 
mental processes most psychology researchers focused on, that were 
the important forces driving human psychology. John Watson then 
argued that neither conscious nor subconscious phenomena were the 
proper focus of psychology and should be replaced with a focus on 
behavior. Starting in the 1950s, humanistic theories and, later, 
cognitive and family systems approaches quickly grew in popularity. In 
the 1970s, feminist and multicultural approaches became influential, 
followed by solution-focused therapy, eye movement and 
desensitization reprocessing, mindfulness-based approaches, 
motivational interviewing, and others. Combining orientations in an 
integrative or eclectic fashion also became common in the 1990s and 
new theoretical systems continue to be proposed (e.g., Henrique, 
2011; Magnavita & Anchin, 2014). 
The problem of irreconcilable theoretical orientations for 
understanding psychological phenomena was recognized right from the 
start. The most influential critique came in 1913 from John Watson, 
who pointed out that the existing theoretical orientations 
fundamentally conflicted in ways that were not resolvable (Watson, 
1913). Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) model of the evolution of scientific 
disciplines is often used to explain this complicated situation. Kuhn 
concluded that psychology was in a preparadigmatic stage of 
development characterized by many conflicting views and competing 
explanations for phenomena and disagreements about what is even 
the proper focus of research. Kuhn argued that a field becomes 
paradigmatic after the emergence of a major scientific achievement or 
school of thought (i.e., a paradigm) that convincingly explains 
phenomena and unites the scientific community in an area. 
There are still many signs of preparadigmatic conflicts and 
practices in contemporary PP. Divides between theoretical camps 
remain serious (e.g., Shedler, 2010; Sternberg, 2005; Wampold et al., 
2010), and none of the theoretical orientations have come to dominate 
PP or the larger behavioral health care field. Surveys of behavioral 
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health professionals consistently find that only a minority, typically 
less than one third of the sample, endorses a particular theoretical 
orientation, even an eclectic or integrative approach (Prochaska & 
Norcross, 2014). There have also been concerns that the use of some 
theoretical orientations is potentially harmful. The use of unreliable 
techniques or unsupported interpretations involving recovered 
memories of child abuse resulted in numerous allegations of harm in 
the 1990s (Loftus & Davis, 2006), and concerns have been raised 
about several other orientations to clinical practice as well (Lilienfeld, 
2007; Norcross, Koocher, & Garofalo, 2006). 
Given the diversity of competing theoretical orientations in PP, 
the standard approach for therapists to show that their clinical services 
are competently delivered has been to select a theoretical orientation 
and learn to apply it consistently in practice. This approach is still 
evident in current educational practices in the field. For example, the 
American Psychological Association (APA) Assessment of Competency 
Benchmarks Work Group (Fouad et al., 2009) identified one of the 
“essential components” of competent practice as follows: “Formulates 
and conceptualizes cases and plan interventions utilizing at least one 
consistent theoretical orientation” (p. S19). To apply to internships 
listed by the Association of Psychology Postdoctoral and Internship 
Centers (APPIC), students need to answer the following question on 
the APPIC Application for Psychology Internship: “Please describe your 
theoretical orientation and how this influences your approach to case 
conceptualization and intervention” (APPIC, 2015). 
Reasons for the Preparadigmatic Proliferation of 
Theoretical Orientations 
Though it may seem unusual that a diverse array of competing 
theoretical orientations for understanding phenomena would develop 
within a scientific discipline, there are very understandable reasons 
why this happened in PP. Many of these reasons are generally well 
known. In addition to the different personalities of the theorists and 
the different historical and cultural contexts in which they worked are 
issues more directly related to the nature of scientific theory and 
research. Four issues are particularly important in this regard 
(Melchert, 2015). 
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First, many of the traditional theoretical orientations in the field 
are based on philosophical assumptions or first principles (e.g., 
biologically based drives in Freudian theory, the blank slate of nearly 
complete malleability in behaviorism, an optimistic self-actualizing 
tendency in Rogerian theory, a postmodern constructivism in solution-
focused therapy). As a result, accepting the validity of these theories is 
based largely on accepting their underlying assumptions. Indeed, 
advice on selecting a theoretical orientation to guide one’s approach to 
clinical practice frequently involves evaluating the fit between the 
personal worldview of the therapist and the assumptions underlying a 
theoretical orientation (e.g., Truscott, 2010). 
A second reason for the preparadigmatic nature of psychology 
involves the problem of nonfalsifiability, which was identified by the 
philosopher of science Karl Popper. As a student in Vienna in 1919, 
Popper heard both Freud and Einstein present their theories. Though 
he was highly impressed with both of them, he observed that Freud’s 
was presented in a way that made it amenable to confirmation, 
whereas Einstein’s had testable implications that, if shown to be false, 
would prove the entire theory wrong. Popper (1963) argued that 
scientific theories must be falsifiable, and genuine tests of theories 
involve attempts to refute them. 
Another reason why the field remained preparadigmatic as long 
as it did was the limited power and precision of the scientific tools that 
were available to investigate the tremendous complexity of human 
psychology. The power of scientific tools (e.g., telescopes and 
microscopes) is well known to constrain the scope of the findings that 
are possible in the natural sciences. The development of practical 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and genomic sequencing 
machines in the 1990s made it clear that progress in the neuro- and 
behavioral sciences was also highly dependent on the power and 
precision of scientific tools. 
Another reason why the behavioral sciences remained 
preparadigmatic as long as they did was the sheer complexity 
involved. Scientists now routinely refer to the human mind and brain 
as the most complex system known to exist in the universe. In just a 
three-pound organ are 86 billion highly connected neurons, each with 
an average of a thousand or more dendritic connections (Azevedo et 
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al., 2009). Together they create feedback mechanisms across the 
biological, psychological, and sociocultural levels that result in 
structures and functions that also continually change and evolve. The 
complexity involved in this system is truly extraordinary compared 
with any other phenomenon known to exist, and uncovering and 
explaining this tremendous complexity will naturally take longer than it 
does to describe and explain most other natural phenomena. This is 
ultimately the most important reason why psychology remained 
preparadigmatic longer than the physical and biological sciences. 
Emergence of the Behavioral Sciences as 
Paradigmatic Disciplines 
 
Despite the truly extraordinary complexity of human behavior, 
research has advanced dramatically in recent years, and a new 
scientific understanding of human psychology has emerged that is 
fundamentally different from what existed previously. There are many 
scientific advances that exemplify this new perspective, but two 
developments have been critical in establishing the behavioral sciences 
as paradigmatic disciplines that are now consistent with the rest of the 
natural sciences. Without these developments, the behavioral sciences 
likely would have not yet unified around a paradigmatic understanding 
of human psychology. One of these developments is theoretical, 
whereas the other is technical. The theoretical development links 
psychology with the single greatest theoretical advance ever in 
biology, namely, evolutionary theory. 
Importance of Evolutionary Theory 
The importance of evolution in human development was 
recognized during the first century after Darwin (1859) published On 
the Origin of Species in 1859, but it was generally not thought to play 
a major role in higher level psychological characteristics because 
humans are so different from other species and culture plays such an 
important role in our mental life and behavior (Mameli, 2007). 
Evolution was viewed as responsible for basic innate mental abilities 
(e.g., sensation, perception, classical and operant conditioning, basic 
logical and probabilistic reasoning), but our more sophisticated mental 
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characteristics were viewed as categorically different from these lower 
level capabilities. In recent decades, however, that view has changed. 
Two major research achievements illustrate how evolutionary 
theory has become essential for understanding the origins, structure, 
and function of human psychology across all biopsychosocial levels of 
natural organization. At the biological level, the very complicated and 
peculiar structure of the human brain was poorly understood until Paul 
MacLean (1967) applied an evolutionary perspective and identified 
three basic structures: the “reptilian brain,” comprising the brain stem, 
cerebellum, and basal ganglia that are very similar to reptile brains; 
the “mammalian brain” that includes the limbic system, which is 
prominent in mammals that live in social groups; and the most 
recently evolved region of the mammalian brain, the cerebral cortex, 
which is especially highly developed in humans. Subsequent research 
found that MacLean’s original “triune brain” proposal was a 
simplification that needed substantial refinement (Streidter, 2005), but 
the highly complicated structure and function of the human brain 
remained largely a mystery before the application of the evolutionary 
perspective. 
At the sociocultural level, prosocial behavior and altruism were 
also largely a mystery until relatively recently. It seemed that selfish 
and antisocial behavior would maximize the survival of individual 
members of a species, and yet humans and other social animals 
routinely also demonstrate highly prosocial behavior and even 
altruism. In 1975, E. O. Wilson noted that this was the greatest 
theoretical problem in all of sociobiology at that time (Wilson, 1975). 
The solution to this problem involved changing the focus of 
evolutionary theory from the reproducing individual to the replicating 
gene—organisms engage in behavior that promotes survival and 
replication of the gene, not necessarily the individual organism that 
carries the gene (Dawkins, 1976). This insight was critical for 
understanding the competing nature of individual and group selection 
that favors both selfishness (individual selection) and cooperation 
(group selection). These competing evolutionary pressures are also the 
source of many conflicted human emotions and cognitions (anger, 
competition, tribalism, curiosity, humility, empathy, love) that are at 
the very core of human psychology (Buss, 2015; Dunbar & Barrett, 
2007; Wilson, 2014). Recent investigations into these types of 
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questions are resulting in dramatic reconceptualizations of the major 
role of culture in the evolution of human social behavior (e.g., Morris, 
2014; Pinker, 2011). 
Many more examples could be presented that show how 
essential features of human nature are unintelligible without 
evolutionary theory (for reviews, see Buss, 2015; Dunbar & Barrett, 
2007). At both the level of mechanisms (“proximate explanations of 
behavior”) and the level of “ultimate explanations of behavior,” or why 
life is designed in the manner it is (Tinbergen, 1963), human 
psychology cannot be understood from a scientific perspective without 
evolutionary theory. This is true from the level of neuroanatomy and 
physiology (e.g., MacLean, 1967), to infant attachment (e.g., Bowlby, 
1969), to cognition and consciousness (e.g., Gazzaniga, 2011), to 
intimate and family relationships (e.g., Fisher, 2004), to interpersonal 
relations and social behavior (e.g., Pinker, 2011). The biologist 
Theodosius Dobzhansky (1973, p. 125) noted that “nothing in biology 
makes sense except in the light of evolution,” and it is now apparent 
that the same observation applies to human psychology as well. The 
behavioral sciences are now fundamentally linked at the theoretical 
level with the rest of the natural sciences in terms of both proximate 
and ultimate explanations (Buss, 2015). This is a historic development 
that, for the first time, unifies psychology around a paradigmatic 
theoretical perspective that is consistent with the rest of the natural 
sciences. This perspective may not yet be well integrated into PP 
education and practice, but it is fully accepted across the behavioral 
sciences generally as well as the biological and neurosciences (see 
Buss, 2015; Dunbar & Barrett, 2007). 
Importance of More Powerful Scientific Tools 
A second critical development for establishing the neuro- and 
behavioral sciences as paradigmatic scientific disciplines has been the 
invention and use of more powerful and precise scientific tools that 
have allowed experimental tests of hypotheses that had to remain 
speculations in the past (Wood et al., 2006). These include both 
conceptual tools (e.g., new statistical procedures) as well as technical 
tools (e.g., genetic sequencing machines). For example, the genetic 
sequencing of individuals’ genomes from around the world has found 
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that all human beings now alive descended from the same parents (a 
common mother who lived about 200,000 years ago and a common 
father who lived about 142,000 years ago; Stringer, 2012). This and 
related research has overturned common misperceptions about the 
biological meaning of race (Omi, 2001). 
Probably the most revolutionary technology that has propelled 
recent advances in understanding the human mind and brain was the 
invention of imaging machines, particularly the development of 
practical functional MRI (fMRI) in the 1990s. Newer imaging machines 
such as diffusion tensor MRI and magnetoencephalography are further 
improving both the spatial and temporal resolution of images of brain 
function. These new technologies are allowing increasingly precise 
observations of brain functioning at both micro and macro levels, and 
these are leading to dramatic advances in understanding a variety of 
psychological processes. For example, the brain has been found to be 
far more plastic than what was commonly believed just two decades 
ago (Davidson & Begley, 2012). Consciousness has also been found to 
arise from the interplay of a wide variety of neural structures, many 
that operate subconsciously, and the finding that the brain makes 
some decisions before the mind becomes consciously aware of them 
has raised challenging questions regarding the nature of responsibility 
and free will (e.g., Gazzaniga, 2011). When Freud and others proposed 
similar ideas in the past, the scientific tools required to rigorously test 
them were unavailable. That limitation has now been surpassed and 
knowledge of human psychology is surging ahead as a result. 
Though research in many areas is still in its early stages, the 
tremendous complexity of human psychology is steadily being 
uncovered. Of course, it will take decades of additional research to 
explain the precise nature and function of many psychological 
mechanisms and processes, and disagreements naturally exist 
regarding findings that have not yet been well replicated and tested, 
as is the case in any scientific discipline. It is also difficult to gain an 
integrated understanding of the existing research because the 
literature is fragmented as a result of the many specializations 
involved. Nonetheless, there is no major disagreement regarding the 
main findings that were mentioned earlier in this section with regard to 
the importance of evolutionary theory and more powerful scientific 
tools. Despite all that remains to be discovered, the behavioral and 
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neurosciences have advanced dramatically and a unified paradigmatic 
understanding of human psychology has emerged that is consistent 
with theory and research across the natural sciences (APA Presidential 
Task Force, 2010). Psychology is no longer a preparadigmatic 
academic discipline, but has become one of the paradigmatic natural 
sciences. 
Emergence of PP as a Unified Clinical Science 
 
The recent transition of the behavioral sciences to a unified 
paradigmatic approach to understanding human psychology compels 
PP to reexamine its curriculum and clinical frameworks and guidelines 
so that any aspects that have become outmoded can be updated or 
replaced. Professional psychologists would all agree that PP is a 
science-based profession that needs to keep current with scientific 
advances and update educational and clinical practices that are no 
longer supported by the best available scientific evidence. 
Identifying changes that are needed at this point for PP to keep 
current with scientific advances will require extensive discussion. 
Central among the topics that need to be addressed is the theoretical 
basis for clinical practice. The theoretical foundations underlying PP 
have been unclear throughout the history of the field, and there has 
been no consensus regarding the appropriate theoretical orientation or 
framework that should be applied to inform clinical practice. This 
problem now appears to have been effectively resolved, however, by 
the underlying science having reached a unified paradigmatic 
understanding of human psychology. To facilitate discussion on this 
and related topics, the following issues are suggested as implications 
of the current scientific understanding of human psychology that PP 
could consider for possible integration into education and practice in 
the field. 
A Single, Unified Theoretical Orientation 
For the first time in the history of PP, the preparadigmatic array 
of conflicting theoretical orientations in the field can now be replaced 
with a unified paradigmatic scientific understanding of human 
psychology. If PP embraces this position, it will precipitate the 
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reexamination of several long-standing practices within the profession. 
For example, ever since clinical and counseling psychology became 
established as professions shortly after World War II, training 
programs have been given great latitude to decide their curriculum, 
because there was no consensus regarding a core curriculum or 
theoretical orientation that students entering the profession should 
master. This was specifically acknowledged at the 1949 Boulder 
Conference, where the conferees agreed that there should be a 
common core but also that there was not “one best way” (Raimy, 
1950, p. 55), and they recommended that the issue be left to 
universities to decide. This perspective is still reflected in the current 
APA Commission on Accreditation (2013) Guidelines and Principles of 
Accreditation, which state that  
the accreditation guidelines and principles are specifically 
intended to allow a program broad latitude in defining its 
philosophy or model of training and to determine its training 
principles, goals, objectives, designed outcomes, (i.e., its 
“mission”), and methods to be consistent with these. Stated 
differently, the Commission on Accreditation recognizes that 
there is no one “correct” philosophy, model, or method of 
doctoral training for PP practice; rather there are multiple valid 
ones. (p. 4) 
The current scientific understanding of human psychology 
suggests a very different approach. From a paradigmatic scientific 
perspective, one does not select from an array of competing 
theoretical orientations or philosophies for understanding natural 
phenomena. Once falsifiable theories are sufficiently tested and 
verified using experimental research methods, then preparadigmatic 
orientations for understanding those phenomena are replaced (e.g., 
once the germ theory of disease was demonstrated by Pasteur in the 
second half of the 19th century, miasma [“bad air”] theory and the 
Hippocratic humoral theory of disease were discarded). Replacing the 
preparadigmatic theoretical orientations in PP with an integrated, 
scientific understanding of human behavior is critical for the field to be 
practiced as a clinical science that is unified around a scientific 
approach to understanding human psychology and behavioral health 
care. 
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The broad outlines of the current scientific understanding of 
human psychology are now evident. A very large body of replicated 
and well controlled research has examined a wide range of 
psychological processes from micro to macro levels, from epigenetics 
and neural plasticity to infant attachment, to the nature of 
consciousness and moral reasoning, to the impacts of social context 
and culture. These findings have also been integrated into falsifiable 
higher level theoretical frameworks that are capturing the complexity 
of human development and behavior in an increasingly comprehensive 
manner (e.g., Davidson & Begley, 2012; Fisher, 2004; Gazzaniga, 
2011; Greene, 2013; Morris, 2014; Pinker, 2011; Ramachandran, 
2011; Sroufe, Egeland, Carlson, & Collins, 2005; Wilson, 2014). 
Though these frameworks cannot be discussed in detail here, it is 
critical to note that they all are based on the observation that human 
cognition, emotion, and behavior are dependent on underlying 
biological structures and processes that interact with psychological and 
behavioral factors, and that these in turn interact with social and 
cultural factors. Knowledge of the inextricably intertwined 
biopsychosocial domains of functioning is simply necessary to the 
scientific understanding of human development and functioning (e.g., 
Engel, 1977; Melchert, 2015; Wilson, 2014). This is true from the level 
of neurons (e.g., neural plasticity; Davidson & Begley, 2012) to the 
level of the individual organism (e.g., the nature of consciousness; 
Gazzaniga, 2011) to the level of relationships (e.g., romantic love and 
parenting; Fisher, 2004) to the level of culture and society (e.g., the 
dramatically different ways that humans treat each other in modern 
society compared with previous eras; Pinker, 2011). It is also 
noteworthy how small a role the traditional theoretical orientations 
play in current scientific explanations of these various processes. 
The current scientific understanding of human psychology is 
tremendously complex, but there is now overwhelming evidence 
supporting this perspective. As a science-based profession, PP needs 
to incorporate this literature into PP education and practice. There is 
not one correct starting point or sequence for learning this literature. 
One could start with the sociocultural level of natural organization, 
particularly because this level has had such a large impact on the 
recent evolution of biopsychosocial functioning and behavior. The 
psychological level is often covered relatively thoroughly in PP 
programs because of the field’s traditional emphasis on cognition, 
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emotion, and behavior at the level of the individual. The biological 
level is often covered less well, particularly in terms of proximate and 
ultimate explanations of behavior. Figuring out how best to 
systematically cover these three interacting levels in PP education will 
require significant exploration, but moving forward with implementing 
this approach could be relatively straightforward. For example, a 
future version of the APA Commission on Accreditation Guidelines and 
Principles of Accreditation might allow broad latitude in the educational 
methods used by training programs (e.g., online and traditional 
courses), but require that the training principles, goals, and designed 
outcomes be oriented around the scientific understanding of human 
psychology—that is, there will be “one ‘correct’ philosophy of doctoral 
training for PP practice” (borrowing language from the current 
guidelines; APA Commission on Accreditation, 2013, p. 4). A future 
version of the APA Competency Benchmarks might likewise include a 
standard that would read: “Assesses and evaluates cases and plans 
interventions based on the scientific understanding of human 
development, functioning, and behavior change.” 
Reconciling the Unified Scientific Basis of Psychology 
with the Many Psychotherapies Available 
For many professional psychologists, the most difficult aspect of 
the transition to a unified scientific approach to understanding 
behavioral health care may involve the loss of the traditional 
theoretical orientations as the basis for conceptualizing clinical cases. 
In the preparadigmatic era of PP, one’s personally adopted theoretical 
orientation played a major role in informing one’s understanding of the 
whole treatment process from the initial conceptualization of the 
nature and etiology of clients’ problems at assessment, to the 
treatment plan one recommended, the treatment one provided, and 
how one evaluated outcomes and effectiveness at the end of 
treatment. This is still usually considered the standard approach for 
learning the profession (e.g., as reflected in the APA Competency 
Benchmarks [Fouad et al., 2009] and the APPIC Application for 
Psychology Internship [APPIC, 2015]). 
Replacing the traditional theoretical orientations with a unified 
scientific understanding of human psychology would not mean, 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
American Psychologist, Vol 71, No. 6 (September 2016): pg. 486-496. DOI. This article is © American Psychological 
Association and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. American 
Psychological Association does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere 
without the express permission from American Psychological Association. 
15 
 
however, that the traditional orientations play no role in behavioral 
health care. Though these orientations may not provide valid 
explanations of the mechanisms responsible for behavior change (e.g., 
even cognitive therapy, one of the most popular of the theoretical 
orientations, is inadequate for that purpose; Kazdin, 2007), and they 
clearly do not provide comprehensive explanations of human 
psychology, they are still very useful. And they will continue to play an 
essential role in behavioral health care because they describe 
psychotherapies that have been empirically demonstrated to be safe 
and effective for achieving behavior change (e.g., APA, 2012). They 
would not be referred to as theoretical orientations because they do 
not refer to theories in the falsifiable, scientific sense of the term. They 
are appropriately referred to as psychotherapies, however, that is, as 
systems of methods and processes that result in therapeutic 
improvements in large numbers of cases when applied appropriately. 
In other words, these therapies might still be found to be effective for 
ameliorating distress and improving functioning even if their original 
theoretical formulations are no longer supported as proximate or 
ultimate scientific explanations of human psychology. Most 
psychotherapies were developed before recent scientific research 
uncovered the mechanisms, functions, and origins of many 
psychological processes, and so it would not be surprising if their 
preparadigmatic theoretical underpinnings are not always supported 
by current scientific knowledge. 
The scientific foundations of behavioral health care consequently 
rely on the now-well-established scientific literature that explains 
human development and functioning as well as the extensive research 
that has demonstrated the safety and effectiveness of a variety of 
therapeutic interventions. Knowledge of both these topics is clearly far 
from complete, however, and particularly regarding the specific 
mechanisms and processes that result in psychiatric syndromes or that 
explain therapeutic improvements. To deal with this situation, PP has 
embraced the principles of evidence-based practice whereby 
practitioners consider the best available research evidence relevant to 
a case and integrate that with their clinical experience as well as 
clients’ preferences, values, and culture (APA Presidential Task Force 
on Evidence-Based Practice, 2006). 
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It is important to note that medicine relies on the same 
evidence-based practice principles as PP because it operates in the 
same context of incomplete knowledge regarding health, dysfunction, 
and disease. Medical science has also made dramatic progress, but 
there is still limited knowledge regarding the cause and cure of many 
medical conditions (e.g., idiopathic diseases such as Alzheimer’s, 
Parkinson’s, Type I diabetes, multiple sclerosis, many cancers, many 
seizures, and pain syndromes). As a result, ameliorating symptoms 
caused by these conditions often becomes the treatment goal. Even 
for diseases that are better understood, existing knowledge may be 
insufficient to indicate specific treatments. Take, for example, heart 
disease. Several medications are available to treat heart disease (e.g., 
anticoagulants, beta blockers, diuretics, statins) as well as a variety of 
surgeries (e.g., angioplasty, bypasses, stents) and implantable devices 
(e.g., pacemakers, defibrillators). Behavioral changes are often 
prescribed as well (e.g., healthy diet, exercise, stress management, 
smoking and alcohol use reduction). Predicting patients’ response to 
treatment can be very imprecise and consequently a stepped approach 
is often used where less intensive, invasive, and risky treatments are 
tried first (Bonow, Mann, Zipes, & Libby, 2012). Physicians should not 
base their evaluation and treatment recommendations on the dictates 
of a personally selected theoretical orientation but instead on the best 
available scientific knowledge, their prior experience, and patient 
values (Institute of Medicine, 2001). Despite incomplete knowledge 
regarding the etiology and treatment of many diseases, medicine 
nonetheless relies on a single, unified scientific approach to 
understand health and disease while employing a range of 
interventions that have been tested for safety and effectiveness. As 
clinical sciences based ultimately on the same incomplete body of 
scientific knowledge regarding human biopsychosocial functioning, 
medicine and PP both now use the same evidence-based approach to 
maximize the benefits and minimize the risks of health care 
intervention. 
New Training Approaches and Resources 
Transitioning to a paradigmatic scientific approach also raises 
questions about changes that may be needed in PP education to 
ensure it is consistent with current scientific knowledge and evidence-
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based practice principles. Many psychologists have considered aspects 
of these questions in detail, but broader discussions (e.g., within our 
professional organizations) may be needed to evaluate whether 
systematic changes are necessary to ensure that the field as a whole 
remains current in terms of education, practice, and research. A 
possible starting point for these discussions would be to revisit the 
question of the need for a core curriculum in the field and what it 
would look like if PP is approached as a unified clinical science 
(Benjamin, 2001). A useful way to begin this discussion would be to 
review the historical development of psychology from a 
preparadigmatic to a paradigmatic science that now has theoretical 
and empirical foundations that are consistent with the rest of the 
natural sciences. This could be followed by an examination of the 
implications of that transition for practicing PP as a unified clinical 
science (e.g., along the lines suggested by the present discussion). 
Discussions will also be needed regarding the appropriate 
breadth and depth of curricular coverage regarding the interacting 
biological, psychological, and sociocultural influences on development 
and behavior. A variety of clinical topics would also need to be 
examined. For example, as a clinical science, it may be important to 
give more systematic attention to the epidemiology of behavioral 
health disorders, the interactions between behavioral and physical 
health and sociocultural factors, the most effective interventions for 
addressing different types of behavioral health problems, the 
prevention of behavioral health and other biopsychosocial problems, 
and the promotion of biopsychosocial health and functioning (Melchert, 
2015). Discussions will likely also focus on the range of skills one 
should possess to conduct assessment, psychotherapy, and other 
behavioral health interventions in different types of general and 
specialized practice settings. The range of skills in research design, 
measurement, and data analysis that are needed to evaluate research 
and carry out one’s clinical responsibilities also needs to be discussed. 
New training resources (e.g., textbooks, competency assessments) will 
need to be prepared, new training models might be considered, and 
accreditation criteria and licensure standards may need to be updated, 
as will continuing education programming. These new educational 
resources and curricula will be especially important for training in 
integrated primary care (see the section titled Integrated Primary 
Care). A variety of stakeholder groups would likely be interested in 
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examining aspects of these questions that most directly pertain to 
them (e.g., graduate and internship training programs, health service 
provider groups, professional societies, accreditation and certification 
bodies), but it would also be important that these groups communicate 
with each other to ensure that important considerations are not 
missed. 
The previous section noted the importance of evidence-based 
practice principles in health care generally. The importance of these 
principles in PP education specifically is exemplified by one of the most 
important documents in the field, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM), a system that is based on limited scientific 
knowledge but still has significant clinical utility. The third edition of 
the DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 1980) was developed out 
of dissatisfaction with the low diagnostic reliability of the earlier 
editions. It relied on a descriptive, atheoretical approach that 
emphasized clinician interrater reliability while setting aside questions 
of etiology, and disorders were included based on voting by 
committees. Many changes were incorporated into the latest (fifth) 
edition of the DSM (DSM–5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013), 
but it, too, relies on the same general approach as earlier editions. 
Well-known problems with this approach are excessive comorbidity, 
the proliferation of hundreds of putatively different pathological 
entities, and the lack of knowledge regarding the biology underlying 
the pathological syndromes (Cuthbert & Kozak, 2013). The science of 
psychopathology, however, has not yet advanced far enough to 
indicate an alternative approach. The National Institute of Mental 
Health was well aware of these problems when it launched the 
Research Domain Criteria project in 2008 to research relationships 
between dysfunctional behavior and neurobiological systems. Because 
that and other research has not yet advanced sufficiently, the DSM–5 
is widely regarded as the best available classification of mental 
disorders, despite its limited scientific foundations (Insel & Lieberman, 
2013). Appreciating these issues is critical when PP is approached as a 
clinical science that relies on the principles of evidence-based practice. 
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More Clinical Perspective on Treatment Effectiveness 
The voluminous literature that has accumulated in recent 
decades regarding the effectiveness of behavioral health care 
intervention has greatly strengthened the scientific foundations of PP. 
The general effectiveness of psychotherapy was unclear until Smith 
and Glass (1977) conducted meta-analyses that compellingly 
demonstrated that psychotherapy was effective, even “remarkably 
efficacious” (Wampold, 2001, p. 71). Research further suggests that 
the effectiveness of psychotherapy often exceeds or is comparable 
with that of alternative psychopharmacological interventions (APA, 
2012). There are still vigorous debates regarding the biopsychosocial 
mechanisms and processes responsible for behavior change (e.g., the 
role of common factors vs. specific treatment effects; Wampold et al., 
2010). This is not unexpected, however, given that psychological 
outcomes are multifactorially determined and the process by which 
individuals change is likely to be complicated as well. But there is no 
longer significant debate regarding the general effectiveness of 
psychotherapy. 
One consequence of having established the general 
effectiveness of psychotherapy is likely to be greater attention on 
objectively evaluating the effectiveness of treatment in the individual 
case. Currently there is substantial emphasis on using empirically 
supported treatments as part of evidence-based practice, but 
additionally monitoring and demonstrating the effectiveness of 
treatment using standardized outcome measures is likely to grow in 
emphasis as well. This practice is also important for identifying cases 
that include deterioration so that treatment can be adjusted to attempt 
a more beneficial outcome (Barlow, 2010; Lambert, 2010). Examples 
from medicine are again useful to illustrate the importance of this 
approach. For many medical conditions, standard practice includes the 
use of objective outcome measures, and it would be considered 
entirely inadequate to employ an empirically supported treatment 
without also systematically monitoring the effects of that treatment on 
an ongoing basis (e.g., routine blood pressure or blood sugar 
measurements to monitor the effectiveness of hypertension or 
diabetes treatment). Of course, many problems and illnesses are not 
reversed or cured (as is the case in behavioral health care as well). 
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Nonetheless, treatments are typically monitored on an ongoing 
individual basis, modified as needed to maximize effectiveness and 
minimize risks, and continuing care for chronic conditions can extend 
for many years. As PP orients more clearly as a clinical science, further 
movement in this direction is likely as well. 
Integrated Primary Care 
Integrated primary care is currently being advocated in the 
United States and worldwide to improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of health care delivery systems, for those with serious 
physical and mental illness as well as the population in general (e.g., 
Belar, 2012; Miller & Prewitt, 2012; World Health Organization, 2008). 
Patient-centered medical homes and other integrated primary care 
models are designed to take more holistic, biopsychosocial approaches 
to the assessment and treatment of physical and mental illness and 
disease (Nielsen, Langner, Zema, Hacker, & Grundy, 2012). 
There is also growing recognition within medicine of the 
importance of behavior in the etiology, consequences, and treatment 
of physical health problems. Indeed, it is estimated that fully 50% of 
morbidity and mortality in the United States is caused by behavior and 
lifestyle factors (Institute of Medicine, 2004). As a result, assessment 
and treatment in integrated primary care is biopsychosocial in 
orientation because of the clear interactions between medical, 
psychological, and sociocultural influences on health and functioning. 
Utilizing one or some combination of the traditional theoretical 
orientations to psychological practice can be very difficult or even 
impossible in these settings; instead, a science-based biopsychosocial 
approach is necessary (Health Service Psychology Education 
Collaborative, 2013; Melchert, 2015). If PP does not fill the need for 
behavioral health expertise in integrated primary care, other 
professions will. 
Conclusions 
 
Remarkable progress has been made in the scientific 
understanding of human psychology. Though many psychological 
phenomena remain only poorly understood at this point, increasingly 
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detailed explanations of numerous aspects of human development and 
functioning are steadily accumulating. Psychology is now firmly 
grounded in experimental findings and tests of falsifiable theories that 
are thoroughly consistent with the rest of the natural sciences. The 
speed at which this has occurred has also been remarkable. Indeed, 
many aspects of the current scientific understanding of human 
psychology had not yet been discovered just a generation ago. 
Textbooks from that time typically relied on the traditional theoretical 
orientations to explain many features of personality, psychopathology, 
and psychotherapy. Many textbooks in PP still take that approach. 
Textbooks in the future, however, will undoubtedly have completely 
different starting points for discussing these topics. They will likely 
note the historical importance of the traditional theoretical 
orientations, but will then proceed to discuss the increasingly well 
established proximate and ultimate scientific explanations of human 
behavior. 
The evolution of psychology to a paradigmatic natural science 
discipline poses critical questions for PP as well. As a science-based 
profession, PP needs to identify outmoded frameworks and practices 
and replace them with approaches consistent with the best available 
scientific knowledge. Before recent years, there essentially was no 
alternative but to rely on the various theoretical orientations for 
guiding clinical practice, because scientific knowledge regarding the 
tremendous complexity of human psychology was too limited. Now 
that a paradigmatic scientific understanding has emerged, however, it 
might be considered irresponsible for PP not to systematically 
transition to the new scientific framework. Some might be inclined to 
propose still another theoretical orientation to attempt to capture the 
expansive and integrative biopsychosocial nature of human behavior, 
but that would not be a scientific approach. Science is cumulative, 
building on verified observations and experimental tests of falsifiable 
theories that explain how natural phenomena are structured and 
organized and why they function the way they do. New theoretical 
orientations in PP generally have not been designed to explain 
phenomena in this manner, but instead typically offer alternative 
explanations of phenomena based on the proponent’s experience and 
worldview. The regular introduction of new theoretical orientations was 
a main feature of the preparadigmatic era in psychology, but that era 
has come to an end. 
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Though difficult in some ways, transitioning to a unified science-
based approach to education and practice in the field will be a very 
welcome development for many psychologists. This has always been, 
after all, the goal of the profession from the start. It would also mean 
that many of the perennial preparadigmatic conflicts between the 
theoretical camps in the field can finally be left behind. More 
importantly, it would mean that PP would become a true clinical 
science guided by an integrated body of scientific knowledge that is 
consistent with the rest of the scientific disciplines and clinical 
professions. Moving ahead with a unified voice grounded firmly in 
science will allow PP to more effectively address people’s behavioral 
health and biopsychosocial needs. This is critical not just for the future 
of the profession but also for the health and well-being of the public 
who we serve. 
Footnotes  
 
1 George Engel introduced the “biopsychosocial model” in 1977 to counter 
what he viewed as the overemphasis on biology in medicine. His 
perspective has been highly influential throughout healthcare and is 
widely regarded as the appropriate framework through which to 
understand health and healthcare. It has also been pointed out that he 
misnamed his approach, however, because he did not propose a model 
in the scientific sense (i.e., that utilizes observations, rules, and 
scientific laws to explain a class of phenomena) but instead used the 
term in its colloquial sense (e.g., McLaren, 1998). Engel’s approach 
technically refers to a metatheoretical framework that points to the 
range of factors that need to be considered to understand theory and 
research in medicine (Melchert, 2015). It takes the same general 
approach as various integrative and eclectic approaches that have 
been introduced in PP and point to the range of factors that need to be 
considered to understand human psychology (e.g., Lazarus’s, 1976, 
BASIC-ID framework). But it does not refer to a falsifiable scientific 
model or theory that explains particular phenomena. 
2 The APA Commission on Accreditation has required that accredited PP 
training programs address the biological, cognitive and affective, and 
social bases of behavior since the late 1970s. Programs were given 
significant latitude in choosing how to cover those topics, however, 
because though it was obvious that biological, cognitive and affective, 
and social factors had major influences on behavior, an integrated 
biopsychosocial understanding that was consistent with the rest of the 
natural sciences (as described earlier) has only recently emerged. In 
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addition, clinical case conceptualization and intervention typically have 
been based on one’s chosen theoretical orientation and not on an 
integrated understanding of the biopsychosocial basis of behavior. This 
led to many conflicting perspectives, several of which became highly 
controversial (e.g., regarding repressed memories of child sexual 
abuse). 
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